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Abstract:  
Due to a limited Welfare State, inequalities of income in Switzerland are comparatively high in 
European comparison. Moreover, these income inequalities have a very strong spatial dimension. 
Wealth and poverty concentrate in the major metropolitan areas of the county, displaying 
complex patterns of city-suburb disparities. As the proportions of people and activities in urban 
areas increase, metropolitan inequalities become a new challenge for the democratic Welfare 
State. Against this background, the paper examines place equality regimes in seven large 
metropolitan areas in Switzerland. First we assess spatial disparities within and across the 
metropolitan areas under scrutiny. Second we examine regional differences in government 
policies to address spatial and social inequalities, showing that fiscal equalisation as well as 
social policies are the two main vectors for such policies. Third, we examine place equality 
regimes across the seven metropolitan areas, focusing on the distribution of municipal revenues 
and expenditures within them. We find a strong correlation between inequality patterns in 
resident wealth on the one hand, and inequality patterns in municipal revenues and expenditures 
on the other hand. However, while core-cities seem to be provided with financial resources that 
are commensurate with high levels of social hardship, this is not the case for poor suburbs. In 
poor suburbs, the low share of redistributive expenditures in the municipal budget is striking. Our 
evidence suggest that this situation is linked to the political ecology of the metropolis, where 
right-wing political preferences in poor suburbs lead to limited social policy engagement by the 
municipal government. 
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1 Introduction 1 
Switzerland has the reputation of being one of the wealthiest countries in the world. Indeed, in 
terms of per capita gross domestic product (GDP), Switzerland has consistently ranked among 
the top four OECD countries (usually after Luxemburg, Norway and the United States) and well 
above the EU 27 average. Inequalities of income from paid work are comparatively low in 
Switzerland. The latest available OECD figures2 show that income inequality in the general 
population in Switzerland is among the lowest in the OECD. The Gini coefficient before taxes 
and transfers is 0.409, denoting that income inequality in Switzerland is well below the OECD 
average (0.467) and also much lower than in the neighbouring countries (Austria: 0.472; France: 
0.483; Germany: 0.504; Italy: 0.534). However, in comparison to other OECD countries, the 
redistributive effect of the Swiss welfare state is limited. Indeed, the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality in the general population after taxes and transfers is 0.303, thus very close to the 
OECD average (0.314), and well above the figure for the neighbouring countries (Austria: 0.261; 
France: 0.293; Germany: 0.295) except Italy (0.337). In addition, the distribution of income after 
taxes and transfers has become more unequal in Switzerland in the last decade (the Gini 
coefficient rose from 0.279 in 2000 to 0.303 in 2009), contrary to the general trend of stable or 
even decreasing inequality in most other OECD countries. Hence, if we look at the disposable 
income in the general population, the picture that Switzerland gives is one of a rather unequal 
society in the European context. 
The distribution of income and wealth has a very clear spatial dimension in Switzerland. While 
the industrialisation in the 19th century was relatively decentralised, the territorial differentiation 
of various economic sectors has increased since World War II. With the gradual shifts towards a 
tertiarised economy, businesses, jobs and production have concentrated in the major cities of the 
Swiss plateau. As a consequence, regional disparities have increased. There are quite substantial 
differences in per capita income across the 26 cantons - the federate states - of the Swiss 
federation. In a small number of cantons located within the three economic powerhouses of the 
national economy - the Zurich, Basle as well as the Geneva-Lausanne metropolitan regions - per 
                                                 
1
  This paper is based on research conducted for the project Cleavages, governance and the media in European metropolitan 
areas, financed by the National Centre of Competence in Research Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century at the 
University of Zurich. Previous versions of the paper have been presented at the workshop “Metropolitan governance and 
social inequality in a global perspective” in at the University of Southern California in January 2009, as well as the APSA 
2009 annual meeting 2009 in Toronto.  
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capita GDP is well above the national average, while it is significantly lower in most other 
cantons. The latest available figures show that per capita GDP in the most wealthy and highly 
urbanised canton (Basle-city) exceeds by more than three times the one of the two poorest, 
peripheral cantons (Jura and Valais).3 However, these three metropolitan regions are also the 
places where poverty concentrates: levels of unemployment as well as the share of residents on 
social welfare are significantly higher than in the rest of the country. These disparities have 
remained fairly stable over the last decade (see Bundesamt für Statistik, 2012). 
Compared to the rest of the country, the major Swiss metropolitan areas are thus simultaneously 
places of affluence and dearth. Against this background, the goal of this paper is to explore the 
link between spatial inequalities and governance in Swiss metropolitan areas. More precisely, we 
aim to understand regimes of place equality in Swiss metropolitan areas. Drawing on the research 
agenda outlined by the International Metropolitan Observatory (IMO), our overall aim is to show 
to what extent public policies set up in metropolitan places can be seen to be conditioned by 
structural determinants – thus reinforcing spatial inequalities – or, to the contrary, must be 
viewed as a response to problems – thus alleviating these inequalities. To put it in other words, 
the objective is to establish whether policy choices of metropolitan places merely reflect the 
socio-economic differences found among them, or whether they express some kind of 
voluntarism aimed at acting upon these differences. Therefore, we are especially interested in 
singling out the importance of socio-economic variables with respect to political variables for the 
explanation of variation in government expenditures across municipalities in Swiss metropolitan 
areas.  
We start with a presentation of spatial patterns of social inequalities in Swiss metropolitan and 
summarise the findings in a five-fold typology of municipalities within metropolitan areas. The 
next section focuses on government policies addressing spatial and social inequalities in 
Switzerland. This section involves an account on cantonal differences of the Welfare State and 
distinguishes a number of regimes that differ with respect to how spatial inequalities are treated. 
The next section turns to patterns of inequalities in metropolitan areas and examines public 
finance data, focusing particularly on spatial inequalities of expenditure for redistributive 
policies. The conclusion wraps up the findings and discusses their implications, both for 
understanding local politics in Switzerland and for the problématique raised by the IMO 
                                                                                                                                                              
2
  See http://stats.oecd.org, accessed June 2012. 
3
  Numbers for 2005. Source: Swiss Statistical Office (http://www.bfs.admin.ch, accessed June 2012). 
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programme. Technical details on data and variables used in the analysis are given in the 
appendix. 
2 Metropolitanization and spatial patterns of social inequalities 
During the 20th century, Switzerland has been profoundly transformed by a still ongoing process 
of metropolitanization. This process has revealed a metamorphosis of relevant elements of urban 
centrality (see Leresche et al., 1995, Cunha and Schuler, 2001, Bassand, 2005). Externally, 
metropolitanization involves the connection to a global order of inter-urban networks. Internally, 
it has led to a recomposition of the urban space, in the sense that metropolitan areas4 are 
nowadays the dominant form of human settlement in Switzerland. These metropolitan areas are 
increasingly functionally integrated, mainly thanks to the development of high capacity transport 
infrastructure. Spatial mobility of goods and persons allows an increasing functional 
specialization of soil, leading not only to accelerated urban sprawl and further expansion of 
metropolitan areas, but in the same time to social segregation within them. As others (Huissoud 
et al., 1999, Cunha et al., 1998) and ourselves (Kübler and Scheuss, 2005) have shown, Swiss 
metropolitan areas are increasingly segregated. As elsewhere, social inequalities translate into 
spatial inequalities in Swiss metropolitan areas. 
Table 1: Characteristics of Swiss metropolitan areas under scrutiny (data for 2000) 
Metropolitan 
area 
Overall 
population 
Overall number of 
municipalities 
Index of 
geopolitical 
fragmentation 
Zurich 1,080,728 132 3.6 
Basle 731,167 127 4.4* 
Geneva 645,608 131 4.2* 
Berne 349,096 43 3.3 
Lausanne 311,441 70 5.6 
Lucerne 196,550 17 2.9 
Lugano 136,032 77 27.1* 
* excluding foreign communes in cross-border metropolitan areas 
 
Among the roundabout 50 metropolitan areas delimited in the latest available official definition 
(Schuler et al., 2005), seven have a population close to or more than 200’000 inhabitants and 
were included in the analysis conducted for the International Metropolitan Observatory Project in 
Switzerland (Kübler and Scheuss, 2005, Kübler et al., in press). These are the metropolitan areas 
                                                 
4
  The notion of metropolitan area originates in the US Census Bureau’s terminology used to define areas of functionally 
integrated urban settlements spread over different administrative boundaries. The official nomenclature of territorial statistics 
used by the Swiss Statistical Office uses the term of agglomerations (in German: Agglomerationen; in French: 
agglomérations; in Italian: agglomerati). They are conceptually equivalent to the US Metropolitan Areas (Schuler, 1999: 334-
340). Throughout this text, we will use the term 'metropolitan areas' as a synonym of agglomerations.  
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of Zurich, Basle, Geneva, Berne, Lausanne, Lucerne and Lugano (Table 1). They cover the 
territory of 482 municipalities5 and total roundabout 3 million inhabitants, which represents 
almost 60% of the country’s urban population. 
In Swiss metropolitan areas roughly two thirds of the overall population live in the suburban area 
outside the core city. The suburban area is usually characterized by a large number of rather small 
local governments. Consequently, geopolitical fragmentation (Zeigler and Brunn, 1980) in Swiss 
metropolitan areas is one of the highest in the world (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers, 2005).  
In order to describe social inequalities within metropolitan areas, the IMO research network has 
constructed a typology of municipalities. The typology distinguishes between urban 
concentrations, poor suburbs, middle class suburbs, affluent suburbs and low density suburbs. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the typology regarding some distinctive socio-economic and 
morphological characteristics. Two indicators for social disparities can be considered here. First, 
on the lower end, so to speak, the measure of socio-economic hardship shows that the urban 
concentrations present the highest level of socio-economic hardship. They are even more 
distressed than the poor suburbs which come next. No clear distinction can be made between 
middle class suburbs and low density suburbs. The lowest levels of socio-economic hardship are 
found in affluent communes. Second, at the upper end of the socio-economic strata, the per capita 
amount of federal income tax on residents shows more or less the reverse pattern. Per capita 
income tax is highest in affluent enclaves - where people with the highest income live. Low 
density suburbs are still clearly above average, while middle class suburbs are roughly on 
average, urban concentrations and poor suburbs clearly below average. This pattern was stable 
over the last decades, as can be seen from the comparison of income tax numbers for 2001 and 
2008. Taken together, it appears that social disparities in Swiss metropolitan areas do not follow 
a pattern of polarisation between the core city and its suburbs, but between the core city and the 
poor suburbs on the one hand, and the middle class, affluent, and low density suburbs on the 
other hand.  
                                                 
5
  This number does not include the municipalities of international metropolitan areas (Basle and Geneva) located 
outside of Switzerland.  
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Table 2: Typology of communes in Swiss metropolitan areas  (data for 2000) 
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Hardship 
index 
Mean 
Per capita 
income tax 
(2000) 
Per capita 
income tax 
(2008) 
Overall (482) 3,009,237 21.7 11.8 32.7 35.0 1457 2116 
Urban concentration (7) 1,047,399 35.2 - 10.8 57.3 970 1437 
Poor suburbs (119) 952,162 29.1 9.7 27.1 50.6 828 1158 
Middle class 
suburbs (119) 502,624 21.1 9.6 27.1 35.5 
1377 2131 
Affluent suburbs (119) 274,148 18.3 9.5 33.4 24.5 2101 3054 
Low density 
suburbs (118) 232,904 17.7 19.0 44.5 28.1 
1561 2155 
 
Yet, socio-economic differentiation across communal types within single metropolitan areas is 
only one aspect of metropolitan social inequalities in Switzerland. There are also differences 
between the seven metropolitan areas under scrutiny when we look at the distribution of poverty 
and wealth across the municipalities within metropolitan areas (Table 3). 
Table 3: Social disparities across Swiss metropolitan areas (data for 2000) 
 
Metropolitan 
area 
Hardship 
Standard 
Deviation 
SES 
Standard Deviation Gini coefficient of per 
capita income tax 
revenues (2000)  
Zurich* 10.8 11.8 0.35249  
Basle* 11.6 12.2 0.24288  
Geneva* 13.1 14.2 0.33384  
Berne 8.3 9.5 0.22250  
Lausanne 13.5 14.4 0.36512  
Lucerne 12.1 8.5 0.26463  
Lugano* 12.3 10.0 0.26830  
Mean 11.6 11.5 0.29282  
* excluding foreign communes in cross-border metropolitan areas 
 
If we look at the standard deviation of the indicator value for socio-economic hardship, we see 
that the hardship is particularly variegated in the Geneva, Lausanne, Lugano and Lucerne 
metropolitan areas. The standard deviation of the index value for general socio-economic-status 
shows that the distribution of the proportions of residents with high socio-economic status is 
particularly uneven in Lausanne, Geneva, Basle and Zurich. This picture of varying patterns of 
social inequalities across metropolitan areas is also confirmed by the Gini coefficients for the per 
capita amount of federal income tax paid by residents in metropolitan municipalities - which can 
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be taken as a good proxy for average income, even though the progressive nature of the federal 
income tax may lead to an overestimation of income at the higher end of the spectrum. In the 
metropolitan areas of Lausanne, Zurich and Geneva, inequality of income between municipalities 
is substantially higher than in the metropolitan areas of Lugano, Lucerne, Basle and Berne. 
3. Government policies to address spatial and social inequalities in 
Switzerland  
In the Swiss federation, there are three levels of government: the federation, twenty-six federate 
states - the so-called ‘cantons’ - and roughly 2600 municipalities - called ‘communes’. The 
federal constitution clearly states that legal competences first and foremost reside within the 
cantons. Their consent is necessary when part of their sovereignty is transferred to the federal 
level. Hence, any transfer of competences from the cantons to the federation requires a change of 
the constitution. The federal government has no direct implementing capacity in its domains of 
competence; implementation of federal policies is left to the cantons and the communes, whereby 
the cantons act as intermediary between the federal government and the communes. Accordingly, 
intergovernmental relations between state levels in Switzerland are characterized by a 
traditionally strong position of the cantons. Communes, as autonomous bodies of the lowest state 
level, are mentioned in the federal constitution, even though the precise definition of their status 
is relegated to the cantons. Communes therefore have no original powers granted to them 
constitutionally, but both the organization of communal institutions and the degree of communal 
autonomy are subject to cantonal legislation. There is thus no unified ‘Swiss’ system of local 
government but rather twenty-six different cantonal systems of local government whose 
autonomy varies strongly. But in general, and compared to other federations, communal 
autonomy is quite high in Switzerland. In Sellers and Lidström’s (2007) typology of local 
government systems, combining the local government capacity (in terms of resources) and local 
government supervision (imposed by higher-level authorities), Switzerland is classified in the 
centre of the spectrum (Sellers and Lidstrom, 2007:  621): local government capacity is qualified 
as medium, and supervision of local government by higher levels is rather limited.  
3.1 Addressing spatial inequalities 
Traditionally, federal policy programmes to address spatial inequalities in Switzerland have first 
and foremost concerned peripheral regions, not metropolitan areas. In the wake of the so-called 
“regional policy”, formulated and implemented since the 1970s, important subsidies have been 
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allocated to economically weak peripheral regions in the mountain areas of the country, in order 
to improve transport infrastructure and accessibility, to strengthen specific economic sectors (e.g. 
agriculture, forestry or tourism), but also with the aim to make remote places more liveable for 
their inhabitants (e.g. via investments in public works such as town halls, etc.). It was only at the 
turn of the millennium that the federal government started to formulate a regional development 
policy also for the urban areas of the country (see Kübler, 2007a, Scheuss and Kübler, 2007). For 
the time being, this “metropolitan area policy” (Agglomerationspolitik) of the federal government 
remains geared essentially towards improving transport infrastructure in large metropolitan areas, 
and is basically aimed at containing further urban sprawl by the promotion of infill development 
and densification. 
a) Fiscal equalisation 
Except for the specific case of peripheral mountain regions, fiscal policy therefore remains the 
main vector of government activity by which spatial inequalities are explicitly addressed in Swiss 
federalism. The rationale for this becomes clear especially when we consider the considerable 
fiscal autonomy of jurisdictions at each state level. The total revenues of the federal state amount 
to roughly one third of overall government revenues indicating a strong decentralisation of fiscal 
resources. This fiscal decentralisation is mostly in favour of the cantons: the share of the cantons 
in the share of government revenues represents about 40 percent. The share of the communes in 
the overall government revenue in Switzerland is roughly 25 percent.  
Figure 1: Sources of government revenue at each state level 
 
 
Source: Federal Finance Administration 2008 
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Yet, the importance of the different sources of revenues varies across state levels (Figure 1). Self-
generated revenues constitute practically the entire income of the federal state, whereas grants 
and transfers represent substantial financial resources for cantons and communes. Sales taxes 
(VAT, taxes on alcohol, cigarettes, energy, etc.) are a prerogative of the federal government and 
correspond to its most important revenue source besides income taxes. After that, the federal 
state’s share of levies and fees is also important and amounts to about two thirds. However, the 
absolute amount of revenues generated by levies and fees is relatively small, which is also true 
for non-tax revenues. However, non-tax revenues, mostly from user charges and capital income, 
are important revenue sources for both cantons and communes and correspond to around 40 
percent of the overall non-tax revenues respectively.  
As regards self-generated revenues of cantons and communes the figures indicate that direct 
taxes represent the most important revenue source. Indeed, governments at all three state levels 
are entitled to levy direct taxes on income and assets of physical and legal persons, as well as 
property taxes. In addition, cantons and communes can set their own tax rate, i.e. decide about the 
proportion of income and assets that is due as tax. This has sparked fiscal competition between 
cantons, but also between communes within cantons. Fiscal competition at the subnational level 
is, by the way, considered as one characteristic feature of Swiss federalism in the internationally 
comparative literature on federal fiscal regimes (Braun, 2003). It has led to substantial fiscal 
disparities between cantons, as well as between municipalities within cantons. In order to 
compensate the most striking differences, systems of fiscal equalisation have been set up at the 
federal level and in most cantons, thereby ensuring a certain redistribution of fiscal resources 
between rich and poor cantons, as well as between rich and poor communes within cantons.  
With respect to cantonal equalisation regimes, it needs to be emphasised that these regimes vary 
in the extent to which they redistribute fiscal resources from rich to poor communes. 
b) Horizontal inter-communal cooperation 
Besides fiscal equalisation, another crucial ingredient of place equality regimes in metropolitan 
areas relates to intergovernmental cooperation at the communal level. Indeed, policy-making in 
Swiss federalism is characterised by a high degree of politikverflechtung (Schenkel and Serdült, 
2006) - even if this phenomenon has not yet reached the same extent as in Germany (see Scharpf, 
1994). The term of politikverflechtung describes a situation where government activities are 
formally conducted by separate bodies with clearly designated competencies (i.e. the federal 
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government, the cantonal government as well as communal governments), but the activities of 
each are closely tied together in practice. A striking case of such intergovernmental 
entanglements are the many schemes of inter-communal cooperation, which are found in all 
Swiss metropolitan areas. Mostly in order to realise scale economies or to facilitate management 
of supra-local infrastructure, communes in metropolitan areas have joined numerous cooperation 
schemes, particularly in the fields of culture, energy supply, waste disposal, social policy, 
security and justice, as well as transportation (Arn and Friederich, 1994). When a commune joins 
such cooperation schemes, it thereby reduces its possibility to autonomously influence 
government output in the policy fields concerned by these schemes. Delegation of policy-making 
to intergovernmental schemes must therefore also be seen as a substantial vector for spatial 
equalisation of government output.  
Horizontal cooperation between municipalities is difficult to measure. However, horizontal 
transfer payments represent a valuable proxy for horizontal cooperation between municipalities in 
a given metropolitan area. (Table 4). The results suggest that horizontal entanglement resulting 
from intermunicipal cooperation is lowest in Geneva, followed by Zurich and Lucerne. In 
Lausanne, Basle and Berne however, horizontal entanglement is rather high.  
Table 4: Inter-communal cooperation across metropolitan areas (measured by horizontal transfer payments at 
the communal level, data for 2000) 
 Communes 
with data / 
total 
communes 
Total transfer payments 
per capita 
(means in 1000 CHF) 
Total transfer payments by 
sum of revenues and 
expenditures 
(means in percent) 
Index of intercommunal 
cooperation 
(sum of z. values) 
Zurich 29 / 132 1.46 19.7 0.33 
Basle 69 / 74 1.71 22.3 -0.55 
Geneva 74 / 74 1.25 15.6 0.92 
Berne 3 / 43 2.56 27.4 -1.76 
Lausanne 70 / 70 1.77 20.8 -0.43 
Lucerne 15 / 17 1.54 19.2 0.08 
Lugano 0 / 72 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Overall 260 / 482 1.57 53.2 0.02 
 
3.2 Redistributive policies: the Welfare State in Switzerland  
With respect to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) well-known typology, Switzerland has often been 
considered to correspond to the liberal welfare state model with a very limited redistributive 
effect, covering only a very reduced range of social risks and keeping social expenditures low. 
Recent developments notably in the field of family policy (see Kübler, 2007b) have however 
increasingly challenged this classification. Today, scholars of Swiss social policy generally agree 
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that the underlying welfare state model is the conservative one. It is characterised by quite a 
comprehensive system of social insurance schemes in the fields of old age, disability, health and 
unemployment, but provides less good coverage of “new social risks” (Bonoli, 2004b) such as 
the reconciliation of work and family life, or the changing skills required by the labour market as 
a consequence of the transition towards the knowledge economy. The Swiss Welfare state simply 
developed at a much slower pace than what was the case in comparable countries - e.g. France 
and Germany - mainly as a consequence of the institutional veto points provided by direct 
democracy and federalism that slowed down decision-making processes (Bonoli, 2006). At 
present the share of social expenditures (22.13% of GDP in the year 2005)6 in Switzerland is 
comparable to most other European countries (see also Bonoli, 2004a). However, as the 
comparison of Gini coefficients of income before and after taxation and transfer shows (see the 
introduction), the redistributive effect of the Swiss welfare state still remains quite limited. 
In a study on the sub-national welfare state in Switzerland, Armingeon at al. (2004) have shown 
that Swiss federalism leaves much room for cantons to shape their own welfare regime. Focusing 
on employment, social security, education and taxation policies, they were able to identify strong 
differences in cantonal welfare regimes that echo the classification made by Esping-Andersen at 
the internationally comparative level. Most relevant for the topic treated in this paper, they show 
that “worlds of welfare” differ between cantons when it comes to social security and taxation 
policies. More precisely, they found that cantonal social policies vary across cantons notably in 
terms of risk coverage and generosity, and that cantonal tax regimes vary across cantons in terms 
of tax load and progressivity.  
All three state levels - federal, cantonal and communal - play an important though differential 
role in social policy in Switzerland. More than half of the total social expenditures are distributed 
by the federal government. But cantons and communes retain important roles in many other 
fields of social policy. In 2004, the federal government was responsible for 55.2% of overall 
social expenditures (mainly via the social insurances, i.e. old age insurance, disability insurance, 
unemployment insurances and health care), the 26 cantons account for 28.9% of expenditures and 
the municipalities for 15.8%.7 This concerns mostly the field of social assistance, i.e. means-
tested benefits to low income households, where cantons and communes are much more involved 
than the federation. Finally, communes are the major player when it comes to areas such as youth 
                                                 
6
  Source: BSV, Schweizerische Sozialversicherungsstatistik 2007. 
7
  Source: BSV, Schweizerische Sozialversicherungsstatistik 2007.  
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protection, and especially homes for the elderly. Interestingly, communal engagement in social 
housing is only minimal, denoting the fact that Switzerland has no strong social housing policy. 
In terms of volume, social assistance clearly remains the main vector for social policies at the 
local level in Switzerland. 
Table 5: Cantonal welfare regimes across metropolitan areas 
Metropolitan area Total 
communes* 
Cantons with 
communes 
Social expenditures 
per capita in 
cantons 
(in CHF, 1999) 
Decentralisation of 
social expenditures 
(share of 
communes, 1999) 
Index of tax 
effort (2000) 
Zurich 132 ZH: 104 2,019.70 58.6% 83.3 
 
 AG: 25 934.40 44.5% 96.5 
 
 SZ: 3 1,155.20 64.0% 75.3 
Basle 74 BS: 3 2,878.20 2.7% 111.3 
 
 BL: 52 1,288.70 45.2% 91.1 
 
 SO: 11 1,156.30 48.8% 100.1 
 
 AG: 8 934.40 44.5% 96.5 
Geneva 74 GE: 42 3,064.00 9.2% 103.8 
 
 VD:32 1,672.80 30.3% 109.8 
Berne 43 BE: 40 1,493.80 55.6% 124.2 
 
 FR: 3 897.70 41.5% 116.4 
Lausanne 70 VD: 70 1,672.80 30.3% 109.8 
Lucerne 17 LU: 15 1,330.40 61.4% 117.0 
 
 NW: 1 853.10 38.6% 71.1 
Lugano 72 TI: 72 1,578.60 28.3% 90.4 
National mean 
  1,554.30 43.0% 100.0 
* excluding foreign communes in cross-border metropolitan areas 
cantons: AG: Aargau, BE: Berne, BL: Basle countryside, BS: Basle city, FR: Fribourg, 
GE: Geneva, LU: Lucerne, NW: Nidwalden, SO: Solothurn, SZ: Schwyz, TI: Ticino, VD: Vaud 
Source: Badac 
 
Table 5 gives an idea of the cantonal social policy profiles that provide the context for 
government action in the field of social inequalities within these metropolitan areas. On the one 
hand, these profiles differ regarding the extent of per capita expenditures in the field of social 
security (cantonal and communal expenditures are taken together). Per capita expenditures are 
highest in the canton of Geneva (GE), closely followed by the canton of Basle city (BS), and 
Zurich (ZH) at some distance. However, while the Geneva cantonal context can be assumed to be 
highly relevant to social policy in the metropolitan area of Geneva, most of the Basle 
metropolitan area is in fact located in the canton of Basle countryside (BL), where per capital 
social expenditures are significantly lower than in Basle city (BS). At the lower end, we find 
Berne, Lugano, Lausanne and Lucerne, where social expenditures per capita in the relevant 
cantonal context are even below the national mean. On the other hand, significant differences are 
also to be noted when it comes to the degree of decentralisation, i.e. the communal share in the 
overall social expenditures. Again, Geneva stands out with the lowest degree of social policy 
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decentralisation (only 9.2% of social expenditures in the canton of Geneva are made by the 
communes). Berne (BE), Zurich (ZH) and especially Lucerne (LU) are found at the other end, 
with a large communal share in the overall social expenditures. 
Following Armingeon et al. (2004) we consider that, besides the level of social expenditures, the 
taxation regime is also an important aspect of the welfare state. Indeed, the taxation regime has 
important redistributive effects inasmuch as it determines how much money the state extracts 
from taxpayers in order to fund the production of public goods. In terms of tax effort8, tax 
regimes vary quite substantially across metropolitan areas (Table 5). In Berne, Lucerne, Lausanne 
and Geneva, taxpayers pay more taxes than in the national average. In Basle, Lugano and 
especially Zurich, taxpayers pay less than average.  
These results on two important aspects of “cantonal worlds of welfare” suggest that there are four 
configurations into which Swiss metropolitan areas under scrutiny can be classified. First, high 
social expenditures and high tax effort denotes a situation where the state is strongly and 
consciously engaged in redistribution. This situation is found in the case of Geneva - at least for 
those communes of the Geneva metropolitan area that are located in the canton of Geneva. This 
probably comes closest to what Esping-Andersen had in mind when speaking of the “social 
democratic” welfare state. Second, and in contrast to the preceding, a combination of low social 
expenditures with low fiscal load - found in Basle and Lugano - means that the state is only 
weakly involved in redistributive policies. This comes close to Esping-Andersen’s “liberal 
welfare” regime. The third configuration, high social expenditures and low fiscal load suggests 
that while social policy is extensive, this is basically made possible because of a favourable tax 
base, where a considerable volume of tax income stems from businesses and wealthy residents, 
thereby limiting the overall fiscal load. This hybrid configuration, found in Zurich, could be 
termed a “liberal redistributive” welfare regime. Finally, a configuration where high fiscal load 
combines with low social expenditures - found in Berne, Lausanne and Lucerne - is difficult to 
assess in terms of welfare regime. While the low level of social expenditures can be seen to result 
from a conscious effort to limit social policy expansion, the reason for the high fiscal load 
remains unclear. If it is mainly the result of an unfavourable tax base - all three of these 
metropolitan areas have a weak economic structure - the welfare regime could be termed “would-
                                                 
8
  The index of tax effort (Steuerbelastung) is calculated by the team of the BADAC in Lausanne and reunites 
indices of the tax load (income and assets) on natural persons, businesses and cars (see: www.badac.ch, table Csi 
10.12).  
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be liberal”. But if high levels of taxation are a conscious means of policy, we then could speak of 
a “liberal-conservative” welfare regime where the role of the state is not per se denied.  
4. Place equality regimes in Swiss metropolitan areas  
Welfare regimes vary across cantons in Switzerland, and we can assume that this also parallels 
variations in government engagement for reducing social inequalities across metropolitan areas in 
Switzerland. We will now turn to examining these place equality regimes. We will, first, look at 
the spatial distribution of overall municipal revenues and expenditures, and second, at the spatial 
distribution of particular expenditures for different policy domains.  
4.1 Spatial inequalities in overall municipal revenues and expenditures 
A comparison of metropolitan area-level Gini coefficients (unweighted and population-weighted) 
on municipal public finance in the metropolitan areas under scrutiny allows a first assessment of 
the spatial distribution of municipal resources (Table 6).  
Table 6: Spatial distribution of municipal revenues and expenditures in Swiss metropolitan areas (data for 
2000)9 
Gini coefficients    
Metropolitan area (canton) 
Total revenues Total revenues 
weighted Total expenditures 
Total expenditures 
weighted 
Zurich* 0.270 0.257 0.299 0.284 
Basle (Basle countryside)* 0.078 0.026 0.070 0.010 
Geneva* 0.156 0.155 0.135 0.161 
Berne 2002* 0.103 0.165 0.107 0.165 
Lausanne (Vaud) 2000 0.159 0.210 0.157 0.216 
Lausanne (Vaud) 2002 0.155 0.185 0.147 0.197 
Lucerne 0.129 0.164 0.107 0.136 
Lugano (Ticino)* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
* excluding extra-cantonal communes in cross-border metropolitan areas.  
Note that the figures only refer to the communes within the canton comprising the largest portion of the metropolitan 
area. If the name of the canton is different from that of the metropolitan area it is indicated in brackets 
 
Except for the metropolitan areas of Zurich and Basle the unweighted Gini coefficients vary 
between 0.10 and 0.16 for both total revenues and total expenditures. As regards population 
weighted Gini coefficients the values are generally higher and vary between 0.50 and 0.22; this 
reflects higher municipal revenues in the core cities (thus increasing concentration on one 
municipality). In general the Gini coefficients for revenues and expenditures are highly 
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correlated. This indicates that, in Swiss metropolitan areas, place-related inequalities in municipal 
revenues translate into inequalities in municipal resources and, hence, into inequalities of 
government expenditures per capita according to metropolitan municipalities. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the (unweighted) Gini coefficients for revenues normally exceed those for expenditures 
indicates a (slight) effect of fiscal equalisation mechanisms.  
A comparison of the Gini coefficients on municipal revenues and expenditures (as displayed in 
Table 6) with the distribution of residents’ wealth within the metropolitan area (as displayed in 
Table 3) allows to assess the degree to which the distribution of income among residents within a 
metropolitan area translates into inequalities in municipal finance. In terms of income inequalities 
among residents, the Gini coefficients for the different metropolitan areas show that these 
inequalities are above average in the metropolitan areas of Lausanne (0.365), Zurich (0.352) and 
Geneva (0.333), and below average in the metropolitan areas of Lugano (0.268), Lucerne (0.264), 
Basle (0.242) and Berne (0.222). These patterns are reflected in the spatial distribution of 
municipal revenues and expenditures: the values of the Gini coefficients show that the 
metropolitan area of Zurich displays the most important inequalities - both for revenues and for 
expenditures. In stark contrast, the Gini coefficients in the metropolitan area of Basle are very 
small and close to perfect equality for unweighted as well as for weighted index values. Yet, the 
Basle figures are probably an artefact as the core city of Basle is not being taken into account.10. 
The values of the unweighted Gini coefficients in the metropolitan areas of Berne and Lucerne 
are small. The weighted Gini coefficients, however, are similar to those of the metropolitan areas 
of Geneva and Lausanne in 2002. This suggests that the fiscal equalisation regimes in place in 
these metropolitan areas advantage core-cities. Finally, values of Gini coefficients in the 
metropolitan area of Lausanne in the canton of Vaud assess the effect of the introduction of a 
cantonal system of fiscal equalisation in 2001. Hence, not surprisingly, fiscal inequalities across 
communes are less important in 2002 than in 2000. Nevertheless, this reduction is only 
substantial if measured by the populatoin weighted Gini coefficient of total revenue distribution. 
Therefore the introduction of the fiscal equalisation regime in the canton of Vaud has, in the first 
                                                                                                                                                              
9
  For the canton of Berne we had to rely on communal data for the year 2002. Appropriate data is not available 
before this year. For the canton of Vaud we also calculated Gini indices for the year 2002 as the cantonal fiscal 
equalisation had been introduced in 2001. Unfortunately no data is available for the metropolitan area of Lugano. 
10
  Basle city is a special case of a municipality which is at the same time a canton. Therefore, no data are available 
for municipal finance for the city of Basle. Using finance data of all communes of the metropolitan areas and the 
canton of Basle City this yields unweighted Gini coefficients for government revenues and expenditures of 0.141 
and 0.152 and weighted Gini coefficients of 0.399 and 0.404 respectively (not reproduced in Table 
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place, brought about an equalisation between the city of Lausanne and the other communes, 
mostly in favour of the former. 
The general finding for the Swiss metropolitan areas, thus, is that there is a high correlation 
between resident wealth, overall municipal revenues, as well as overall municipal expenditures. 
As such, this finding does not suffice to qualify the place equality regimes in Swiss metropolitan 
areas as problematic. A comparison between municipal revenues, expenditures and hardship 
index values across types of municipalities allows to shed further light on this issue (Table 7).  
Table 7: Average total municpial revenues and expenditure (in CHF), hardship index 
(data for 2000, corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Types of municipalities Revenues 
 per capita 
Expenditures 
per capita Hardship index 
Urban concentrations 6,887 5,585 57.3 
Poor suburbs 4,136 3,126 50.6 
Middle class suburbs 4,178 3,190 35.5 
Affluent suburbs 4,198 3,027 24.5 
Low density suburbs 4,065 2,948 28.1 
Overall 4,177 3,091 35.0 
 
It shows that a first distinction must be made between urban concentrations on the one hand, and 
the suburban municipalities on the other hand. In urban concentrations, resident wealth is inferior 
to all suburban municipalities except poor suburbs (as is shown above in Table 2); nevertheless, 
municipal revenues and expenditures are highest there (Table 7). Higher municipal revenues in 
urban concentrations result not only from equalisation schemes that generally benefit core cities 
within metropolitan areas, but probably also from business tax as businesses concentrate in core 
cities. Hence, it seems that place equality regimes in Swiss metropolitan areas provide core city 
governments with resources that are commensurate to addressing above average levels of social 
hardship. Second, looking at suburban municipalities, we see that per capita government revenues 
are similar across types of municipalities. This suggests that there is indeed an equalising effect 
of transfer regimes with respect to municipal revenues. Things are different at the expenditure 
side, however. Per capita municipal expenditures are highest in middle class suburbs, a little 
lower in poor suburbs, and substantially lower in affluent and low density suburbs. This is 
surprising given the level of hardship found across the suburban municipalities. If government 
                                                                                                                                                              
6).Consequently, this relatively high degree of fiscal inequality is mostly due to the congruence between the city 
and the canton of Basle. 
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expenditures were used to address hardship problems, they should be higher in poor suburbs - 
which is manifestly not the case. 
4.2 Government expenditures of metropolitan municipalities in different policy fields 
On what do municipal governments in Swiss metropolitan areas spend public money? And how 
are expenditures for different types of public services distributed within metropolitan areas? In 
order to examine this question, municipal expenditures in the metropolitan areas under scrutiny 
were classified according to the IMO protocol, distinguishing between the five following 
categories of municipal public expenditures: general administration, redistributive expenditures, 
amenities and other operational costs, as well developmental and capital expenditures (see 
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. in the appendix). 
Gini coefficients for these categories of municipal public expenditures  were calculated for the 
seven metropolitan areas (Table 8). Echoing the previous finding regarding overall municipal 
revenues and expenditures, the measure of the spatial distribution of the various expenditure 
categories across the metropolitan areas shows that Zurich is clearly the most inegalitarian 
metropolitan area: population-weighted Gini coefficients are high for all expenditure categories 
except for general administrative expenditures. 
Table 8: Inequality of categories of communal expenditures in Swiss metropolitan areas (data for 2000) 
weighted Gini indices    
Metropolitan 
area general administration 
expenditures 
redistributive 
expenditures 
amenities and other 
operational costs 
developmental and 
capital expenditures 
Zurich* 0.011 0.245 0.220 0.415 
Basle* 0.009 0.033 0.085 0.107 
Geneva* 0.030 0.048 0.308 0.006 
Berne n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lausanne 0.259 0.078 0.361 0.374 
Lucerne 0.156 0.108 0.222 0.179 
Lugano* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
* excluding foreign communes in cross-border metropolitan areas 
 
The situation in Basle is clearly more egalitarian - but, again, the figures do not include 
government expenditures of the core city. The Gini coefficients in Geneva are, except for 
amenities and other operational costs, also very small denoting low levels of spatial inequalities 
with respect to the various expenditure categories. In Lausanne and Lucerne, the dispersion of 
expenditures across municipalities is relatively high, except for redistributive expenditures.  
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How can these spatial distributions of expenditures in the various categories be explained? A first 
answer can be given by looking at the average share of expenditure categories in the overall 
municipal budget across types of metropolitan municipalities (Table 9).  
Table 9: Average shares of local government spending on various functions 2000 
(corrected for metropolitan area effect) 
Type of municipalities (N) General administration Redistributive Amenities and other 
operational costs 
Developmental and 
capital expenditures 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Urban concentrations (4) 15.0 3.86 35.9 11.59 29.4 15.48 19.8 14.08 
Poor suburbs (68) 15.8 5.78 47.8 10.74 21.5 9.26 14.9 7.67 
Middle class suburbs (57) 17.6 6.97 45.3 11.66 20.6 8.63 16.5 7.57 
Affluent suburbs (79) 20.3 7.08 43.2 14.11 19.8 9.45 16.7 6.61 
Low density suburbs (90) 16.4 6.12 54.4 13.73 11.6 10.06 17.6 6.42 
Overall (298) 17.5 6.66 47.9 13.56 18.0 10.43 16.6 7.14 
 
Overall the shares of the various expenditure categories do not vary substantially across types of 
municipalities. In general redistributive expenditures cover the most important share of local 
government spending in all types of suburban municipalities. Its proportion amounts to about half 
of an average municipal government's total expenditures. Although variance across communal 
types is important low density suburbs often display the highest expenditure shares in this 
category. Shares of expenditure for amenities and other operational costs, general administration 
and developmental and capital expenditures are equally important. On average these categories 
cover about one sixth to one fifth of total spending each. Spending on general administration is 
on average less important in poor suburbs and core cities (15.8 and 15.0 % respectively) than in 
middle class, affluent and low density suburbs (17.6, 20.3 and 16.4 % respectively). In core cities 
a bit more is spent on developmental policies than in municipalities of the other types. 
Comparing these results with the figures on redistributive spending there is an inverse pattern 
across types of municipalities. This suggests that there is a trade off between redistributive and 
developmental spending. Comparing expenditures for developmental and amenities policies one 
finds a negative correlation among the suburban types: Whereas poor, middle class and affluent 
suburbs spend less on developmental policies (14.9, 16.5 and 16.7 % respectively) than low density 
suburbs (17.6 %), they display higher proportions of expenditures for amenities (21.5, 20.6 and 
19.8 % respectively) than low density suburbs (5.1 %). However, the highest proportion for 
spending on amenities and other operational costs can be found in core cities (29.4 %). A similar 
pattern is revealed by the figures on general administration and amenities expenditures: Whereas 
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core cities, poor and middle class suburbs spend less on general administration (15.0, 15.8 and 
17.6 % respectively) than affluent and low density suburbs (20.3 and 16.4 % respectively) 
spending on amenities is more important in core cities, poor and middle class suburbs (29.4, 21.5 
and 20.6 % respectively) than in affluent and low density suburbs (19.8 and 11.6 % respectively). 
Municipalities in Swiss metropolitan areas display quite varied expenditure profiles. However, 
these expenditure profiles do not seem to be related to the socio-structural characteristics of these 
municipalities. Indeed, the share of redistributive expenditure is not substantially higher in poor 
suburbs or urban concentration - characterised by high levels of social hardship - compared to the 
other types of municipalities. Structural determinants do apparently play an only limited role for 
expenditure profiles of metropolitan municipalities in Switzerland.  
Hence, it makes sense to look at other determinants, such as the political preferences of the 
municipal electorate. As we have shown elsewhere (Kübler et al., in press), the political ecology 
of Swiss metropolitan areas is spatially differentiated. First, an analysis of levels of turnout in 
local and national elections has revealed a tendency towards localisation of political behaviour as 
one moves from the core city to the periphery of a metropolitan area. Whereas the electorate in 
the core cities seems to be less locally oriented than in the suburban zones of a metropolitan area, 
local orientation of political behaviour is particularly strong in low density suburbs at the 
outskirts of a metropolitan area. Second, in terms of political preferences, the analysis of 
partisanship has yielded a threefold cleavage between leftist cosmopolitan core cities and 
nationalist conservative poor suburbs, while the voters living in the remaining middle class 
suburbs, affluent suburbs and low density suburbs more often lean towards right-wing liberalism. 
Following the party differentiation hypothesis (see Schmidt, 1993), we can assume that the 
political preferences found in a given municipality can have an effect on its policy profile, as 
measured by the share of expenditure categories. In particular, knowing the propensity of left 
parties for redistributive policies, we can expect that strong preferences for left parties in a 
municipality go along with high shares of redistributive expenditures.  
A correlation analysis shows that there are indeed significant correlations between the left-right 
partisanship index at the municipal level on the one hand, and municipal expenditures in some of 
the categories (Table 10).  
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Table 10: Correlation (Pearson correlation coefficients) between partisanship indices and shares of 
communal expenditures in categories (partisanship data: mean for 1999 and 2003 elections; finance data for 
2000) 
 
General 
administration Redistributive 
Amenities and other 
operational costs 
Developmental and 
capital expenditures 
Economic left right index 0.317* -0.242* -0.150* 0.293* 
* significant at p<0.01 
 
In general, there is an overall relationship between political preferences for the left (low values of 
the economic left-right index) and high shares of redistributive expenditures at the municipal 
level. Similarly, left political preferences are correlated with expenditures for amenities, while 
general administration expenditures and developmental expenditures are associated with right 
political preferences. Partisanship in the metropolitan municipalities therefore appears to have an 
effect on policy preferences, particularly with respect to redistributive expenditures. However, 
knowing that partisanship in metropolitan municipalities interact with socio-demographic and 
place-related variables (Kübler et al., in press), it would be necessary to conduct multi-variate 
regression analyses in order to single out the influence of various determinants and to buttress the 
influence of partisanship. Problems of data availability data have, so far, only allowed partial 
such analyses which were inconclusive as yet (results not shown). For the moment, the question 
of how important the partisanship variable is with respect to other socio-structural variables for 
explaining redistributive expenditures in Swiss metropolitan municipalities must remain open.  
In addition, it would be illogical if the partisanship effect was uniform across metropolitan area. 
In section 2 we have seen that the degree of municipal autonomy is very different across cantons 
(as far as vertical autonomy is concerned) and metropolitan areas (due to varying levels of 
intergovernmental cooperation)(Table 4). Municipal autonomy translates into the extent to which 
municipal governments can effectively translate their preferences into policy. Hence, we would 
expect that the effect of partisanship on municipal expenditure profiles is stronger when 
communal autonomy is high, respectively weaker when communal autonomy is low. Figure 2 
presents  the relationships between the value of the economic left-right partisanship index at the 
municipal level, and the share of redistributive expenditures in a municipal budget, differentiated 
by three levels of intergovernmental autonomy (left hand graph) and three levels of vertical 
autonomy (right hand graph).  
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Figure 2: Relationship between economic left-right partisanship and the share of redistributive expenditures 
in municipal budgets, according to levels of intergovernmental autonomy (left hand graph) and vertical 
autonomy (right hand graph)  
 
 
The results show that the level of intergovernmental autonomy (inverse to the intensity of 
intermunicipal cooperation) has a strong and systematic effect on the relationship between 
partisanship and the share of redistributive expenditures in a municipality’s budget. The more 
intense intermunicipal cooperation, the weaker this relationship. Vertical autonomy (i.e. 
decentralization of social policy) also plays a role. But this effect is less systematic: in weakly 
and strongly decentralized cantons, the relationship between partisanship and the share of 
redistributive expenditures is storng, in the intermediate category, it is weaker. Hence, we can say 
that, in the field of redistributive expenditures “politics matters” most in metropolitan areas 
where municipal autonomy is not hampered by horizontal entanglement. As a corollary, in 
metropolitan areas where communes are strongly involved in intergovernmental cooperation 
schemes, “politics does not matter” for the extent of redistributive expenditures at the communal 
level. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has explored differences between metropolitan areas in Switzerland in terms of 
government policies to address social inequalities. We have seen that metropolitan areas differ 
greatly with respect to the “welfare regimes” that can be found in the larger cantonal context in 
which they are embedded. In addition, there is a broad array of “place equality regimes” that can 
be found across Swiss metropolitan areas, involving different combinations of fiscal equalization 
and social policies, ranging from rather centralized egalitarianism in Basle to local choice 
inegalitarianism in Zurich, to name but two examples.  
economic left/right
2.70 2.60 2.50 2.402.30 2.20 2.10 
pr
o
po
rt
io
n
 
o
f r
e
di
s
tr
ib
u
tiv
e
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
s
 
(%
)
80 
60 
40 
20 
0
high policy autonomy 
middle policy autonomy 
low policy autonomy 
high policy autonomy 
middle policy autonomy 
low policy autonomy 
IntergvttAutonomy
economic left/right
2.70 2.60 2.50 2.40 2.30 2.20 2.10 
pr
o
po
rt
io
n
 
o
f r
e
di
s
tr
ib
u
tiv
e
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
s
 
(%
)
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
high political autonomy 
middle political 
autonomy 
low political autonomy 
high political autonomy 
middle political 
autonomy 
low political autonomy 
Vertical  Autonomy
23 
Second, we have focused on municipal expenditures, using data that has not been available up to 
now. Based on the fivefold IMO-typology of metropolitan municipalities our analysis has 
revealed important differences at the level of municipal expenditures with respect to socio-
structural disparities. Firstly, there are considerable differences between core cities and their 
suburbs as regards income and expenditures. Core cities gain and spend more per capita than the 
suburbs. Financial capacities of core cities are thus important, a situation that could help to 
alleviate trade offs between policy preferences. For instance core cities can afford to spend 
simultaneously on redistributive policies and development policies whereas suburban communes 
have to decide on priorities. Yet, more detailed data on expenditures of core cities is needed to 
test this hypothesis more accurately. In general, however, we have shown that redistributive 
expenditures are the most important category of municipal expenditures in Swiss metropolitan 
areas. The proportion equals around half of the total expenditures. In the Swiss context, we can 
therefore say that it makes perfect sense to focus on redistributive expenditures if we want to 
capture issues of metropolitan governance.  
As regards the political variables the question outlined in the introduction was whether and how 
ideological differences are linked to the provision of public goods and services. Our bi-variate 
analysis suggested that there is indeed a link between political preferences and redistributive 
expenditures - albeit mediated by the level of communal autonomy. We find a strong correlation 
between inequality patterns in resident wealth on the one hand, and inequality patterns in 
municipal revenues and expenditures on the other hand. In poor suburbs, the low share of 
redistributive expenditures in the municipal budget is striking. Our evidence suggests that this 
situation is linked to the political ecology of the metropolis, where right-wing political 
preferences in poor suburbs lead to limited social policy engagement by the municipal 
government. Overall, however, more thorough analyses are needed to show to what extent socio-
demographic and institutional factors leave room for political voluntarism.  
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7. Methodological Appendix 
Our analysis is based on communal data on socio-economic composition, spatial context, voting 
behavior and public finances covering the years 1990 and 2000, in the seven largest metropolitan 
areas in Switzerland – i.e. over or near 200’000 inhabitants according to the 2000 population 
census. The lion’s share of data has been provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and the 
Swiss Federal Tax Administration. Yet, data on local political variables as well as local public 
finance data are rarely centrally stored and had to be collected for the purpose of this paper. A 
request to provide local electoral as well as additional data on public finance was sent to all the 
482 communes under scrutiny in this project. Data was delivered mostly on paper and had to be 
entered manually in the database.11 
Table 11: Overall ranges of return rates of public finance data 
 
Communes (N) Valid (N) Return rate 
Metropolitan area 482 262 – 298 54 - 62 % 
Zurich 132 32 – 62 24 - 46 % 
Basle 74 69 – 71 93 - 96 % 
Geneva 74 74 100 % 
Berne 43 2 – 6 5 - 14 % 
Lausanne 70 70 100 % 
Lucerne 17 15 88 % 
Lugano 72 0 – 1 0– 1 % 
Type of commune 482 262 – 298 54 - 62 % 
Urban concentrations 7 3 – 4 43 - 57 % 
Poor suburbs 119 59 – 68 50 - 57 % 
Middle class suburbs 119 51 – 58 43 - 49 % 
Affluent suburbs 119 69 – 79 58 - 66 % 
Low density suburbs 118 78 – 90 66 - 76 % 
 
                                                 
11
  Data collection takes place in the context of a Research Seminar held by the authors at the University of Zurich. The authors 
are grateful to all the participants in the Research Seminar, and particularly to Philippe Rochat, for precious help in this 
herculean endeavour. 
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Data collection has not yet finished and the dataset is still fragmentary. Table 11 lists overall 
ranges of return rates as regards public finance data. The overview of the return rates gives an 
idea of possible biases. Whereas the metropolitan areas of Basle, Geneva and Lausanne generally 
display return rates of more than 80 percent there are no cases representing the metropolitan areas 
of Lucerne and Lugano. Especially in the case of the only Italian speaking metropolitan area of 
Lugano this is deplorable. The metropolitan areas of Zurich and Basle are represented by less 
than 20 percent valid cases. Note that range of return rates of metropolitan areas of Geneva and 
Lausanne goes from 0 to 100 percent. This is due to poor availability of appropriate expenditure 
data. 
Table 12: Description of variables used (if not indicated all variables refer to year 2000) 
Variable name definition missing values 
  commune-level variables   
Federal direct tax per capita (2000) Total federal tax perceived in municipality / population size 0/482 
Federal direct tax per capita (2008) Total federal tax perceived in municipality / population siz 0/482 
Total revenue per capita total local revenue / population size 186/482 
Total expenditure per capita total local expenditure / population size 184/482 
Transfer revenues share of transfer payments revenue relative to total local 
revenue 
217/482 
Transfer expenditures share of transfer payments expenditure relative to total local 
expenditure 
220/482 
Tax rate index index: 100*(tij/mean(tj)), 
where: 
t: tax rate 
i: commune subscript 
j: canton subscript 
2001: 65/482 
General administration expenditures Sum of expenditures of the official functional categories 
- general administration 
184/482 
Redistributive expenditures Sum of expenditures of the official functional categories 
- education 
- health 
- social welfare 
184/482 
Amenities and other operational costs Sum of expenditures of the official functional categories 
- culture and leisure  
- environment and spatial planning 
- public safety 
184/482 
Developmental and capital expenditures Sum of expenditures of the official functional categories 
- transport 
- economy 
184/482 
SES Hardship summary index: (100*(xi-xmin)/(xmax-xmin))/5, 
where: 
x1: proportion of people with low socio-economic status 
x2: proportion of unemployed people 
x3: proportion of people with low education profile 
x4 proportion of people in residences where number of rooms is 
smaller than number of occupants 
x5: proportion of retired people 
0/482 
SES Generally summary index: (100*(xi-xmin)/(xmax-xmin))/3, 
where: 
x1: proportion of people with university degree 
x2: median income 
x3: proportion of heads of household with higher education 
(higher professional education, applied sciences university, 
university) 
0/482 
Intergovernmental autonomy Sum of standardised total transfer payments per capita and the 
standardised total transfer payments by sum of revenues and 
expenditures 
222/482 
Distance to the centre geographic distance from a commune’s centre to the centre of 
metropolitan area’s core city in metres: sqrt((x1-x2)2*(y1-y2)2), 
where x and y indicate coordinates of geographic centres 
5/482 
New housing proportion of dwelling houses built during the last 20 years 
(without renovations) 
0/482 
Mean left/right position 
(ideological centre of gravity ICG) 
(see below operationalization), average of the National Council 
elections 1999/2003 
0/482 
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Table 21 (continued) : Description of variables used (if not indicated all variables refer to year 2000) 
Variable name definition missing values 
   MA-level variables   
Gini coefficient ( )( )∑
−
=
++ +−−=
1
1
111
n
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kkkk YYXXG
 
where: 
G: Gini coefficient 
X: cumulative percentage of population 
Y: cumulative percentage of either total expenditures, total 
revenues or redistributive expenditure per capita 
5/7 
Metropolitan population population size of metropolitan area 0/7 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) number of communes per 10,000 inhabitants divided by the 
central city’s share of the overall metropolitan population in 
percent 
0/7 
   Canton-level variables   
Vertical autonomy Sum of standardised perceived autonomy (Ladner 2005) and 
standardised share of communal public expenditures (Badac) 
0/7 
Sources: 
- coordinates of the communes’ geographical centres: Institute for Transport Planning and Systems (ETH Zurich) 
- median income: Federal Tax Administration 
- local public finance data: statistical offices and finance administrations of cantons and communes 
- all other data: Swiss Federal Statistical Office:  
 
Ideological Centre of Gravity (Gross and Sigelmann, 1984: 467) 
( )∑
=
=
P
p
pp vposICG
1
*
 , 
where 
ICG: ideological centre of gravity 
pos: party's ideological position 
v: party's vote share 
p: party subscript 
 
